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Characteristics? Multiple Comparative Case Studies of the
Confucius Institutes
Xin Liu
University of Central Lancashire, UK
ABSTRACT
This article explores the prominent features of China’s state-led campaign of
cultural diplomacy. Through multiple comparative case studies of its ﬂagship
project of the Confucius Institute (CI), it aims to identify and contextualise the
various variables aﬀecting its eﬀective operation. It ﬁnds that this dependent
variable ismainly determinedby the independent variable of the CI’s ability to
localise its product and process to suit diﬀerent target audiences, along with
a number of extraneous variables, including ideology, nationalism and the
media environment in the destinations. People-to-people interaction is also
an important mediator that contributes to facilitating mutual understanding.
All the variables and the complexity of their inter-relations constitute the
Chinese characteristics and are charted out in a diagram.
Introduction
In today’s world that is marked with economic globalisation, political multi-polarisation and cultural
diversiﬁcation, China wishes to re-establish its signiﬁcance as a major cultural power in its ascent to
global prominence through economic rise. A state-led campaign of cultural diplomacy was staged for
this purpose. As the term suggests, cultural diplomacy involves both a dimension of ‘culture’ and
‘diplomacy’, and this strategy demonstrates changes in China on both fronts. Following the induction
of the national strategy of ‘Going Global’ (zou chu qu) in the 10th Five Year Plan in 2001, the cultural
front responded by announcing its own strategy of ‘going global’ in 2002: the mission of ‘establishing
a brand new image of China and building China into an international cultural centre’ was expected to
be achieved through ‘inﬁltrating into mainstream international community and mainstream media’
according to the then Chinese Cultural Minister Sun Jiazheng.1 Then in 2004, culture was declared to
be the third pillar of China’s diplomacy after politics and economy.2 The government rhetoric was
quickly matched with signiﬁcant investments into various high-proﬁle initiatives and a series of
milestone events that marked the ﬂedgling of a ‘cultural leap outward’: from the debut of the ‘Year
of Chinese Culture’ series in France, Italy, Russia, and Australia in 2003, to the opening up of the
Confucius Institutes (CIs) all over the world since 2004; then from launching the 24-hour cable news
channels and newspapers (China Daily Asia Weekly and European Weekly) overseas in 2010, to staging
the Chinese image advertisement in New York Time Square in 2011.
CONTACT Xin Liu xliu13@uclan.ac.uk
1Liying Yang, ‘Xinshiqi Zhongguo wenhua “zouchuqu” zhanlue de yiyi’ [The signiﬁcance of the ‘going global’ strategy of
Chinese culture in the new era], Renmin Luntan, [People’s Tribune], (11 August 2014), http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/
2014-08/11/content_1475959.htm (accessed 15 June 2018).
2Chunyang Zhu, ‘Zhongguo wenhua zouchuqu weihe kunnan chongchong?’ [Why is the ‘Going Global’ of Chinese culture beset
in diﬃculties?] Zhongguo Wenhua Chanye Pinglun [Review of Chinese Cultural Industry] 2, (2012), pp. 84–104.
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On the diplomatic front, there was also a gradual evolvement from the stance of ‘keeping a low
proﬁle’ in Deng Xiaoping’s era to ‘striving for achievements’,3 which was formally presented as the
new strategy in Xi Jinping’s speech at the foreign aﬀairs conference in 2013. Although Deng’s
open-door policy that has propelled China’s economic reform was acclaimed as the ‘Great Leap
Outward’,4 it was not fully applicable to the diplomatic front during his time. These concurrent
changes taking place in both dimensions of ‘culture’ and ‘diplomacy’ mirror the shifts in China’s
self-identity and its drive to reshape its global cultural identity.
This article aims to explore the Chinese characteristics of this ‘cultural leapoutward’ anddiscusswhat
makes it truly ‘great’ by examining the trajectory of China’s global cultural footprints made through its
recent expansion of the CIs. Since its ﬁrst launch in 2004, there were altogether 525 CIs operating in 146
countries and regions around the world by December 2017.5 Nine CIs were closed down or announced
their decisions to do so between 2013 and 2018, receiving globalmedia attention and triggering a lot of
debates: apart from the Lyon Confucius Institute that was closed by Hanban in 2013,6 the other eight
decisions to terminate their renewable CI agreements were all made by the host institutions—
Macmaster University in 2013, Chicago and Penn-State universities in 2014, Stockholm University in
2015, and most recently the University of West Florida, Texas A&M University, the University of North
Florida and the University of Michigan in 2018. If we look at the sheer number of these closures, the tiny
proportion of 9 out of over 500may be rightfully considered a sign of the ‘success’ of the CI. However, if
we look at their calibres and locations, we will note the fact that they were all hosted by prestigious
universities in North America and Europe, the twomost targeted areas that have received the largest CI
spreads: the U.S. is home to the biggest number of CIs (110 in total) in the world, while Europe has the
most concentrated coverage (173 in total).7 If the sustainable and eﬀective operation of the CIs is the
dependent variable (DV), what is the independent variable (IV) that aﬀects it? This article aims to identify
it along with other extraneous variables (EV), and test the causation throughmultiple comparative case
studies of the CIs.
Data and method
The CI was selected to be the comparative case study based on two major considerations. Firstly, it
represents the most watched eﬀort of China’s cultural diplomacy and is highly controversial. While its
impressive speed of global coverage can be seen as evidence for its early success, it has also received its
share of criticisms in the short time-frame of the rapid expansion, which can be found in both prestigious
academic publications and inﬂuential media outlets. This made it a very illustrative case to show both the
opportunities and challenges faced by China’s cultural diplomacy and to explore its distinctive features.
The second reason is that despite the growing interest in the CI reﬂected in recent studies
and media reports, only a handful of case studies have been done by academics so far, and
they have only focused on CIs in one country, such as the US,8 Germany,9 Australia10 and South
3Xuetong Yan, ‘From keeping a low proﬁle to striving for achievement’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7(2), (2014),
pp. 153–84.
4Hang-Sheng Cheng, ‘Great Leap Outward?’ FRBSF Weekly Letter, (5 January 1979), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6458094.
pdf (accessed 8 September 2016).
5About the Confucius Institute/Confucius Classroom, Hanban website, (2017), http://www.hanban.edu.cn/confuciousinstitutes/
node_10961.htm (accessed 3 May 2018).
6Christopher R. Hughes, ‘Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the Cultural’, Issues &
Studies 50(4), (2014), pp. 45–83.
7About the Confucius Institute/Confucius Classroom, Hanban website, (2017), http://www.hanban.edu.cn/confuciousinstitutes/
node_10961.htm (accessed 24 May 2018).
8Amy Stambach, Confucius and Crisis in American Universities, Culture, Capital, and Diplomacy in U.S. Public Higher Education
(New York: Routledge, 2014); Jennifer Hubbert, ‘The anthropology of Confucius Institute’, Society of East Asian Anthropology,
(5 May 2014), http://www.aaanet.org/sections/seaa/2014/05/the-anthropology-of-confucius-institutes/ (accessed
1 September 2017).
9Falk Hartig, ‘Confucius Institute and the Rise of China’, Journal of Chinese Political Science 17(1), (2012), pp. 53–76.
10Jeﬀrey Gil, ‘Dragon in the room: who’s afraid of Confucius Institutes?’, Asia Times, (21 December 2017), http://www.atimes.
com/dragon-room-whos-afraid-confucius-institutes/ (accessed 20 May 2018).
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 647
Africa.11 No comparative approach has been applied yet to examine this ﬂagship project of
China’s ‘going global’ strategy—both its aim to improve China’s ‘global’ image and the means
through ‘global’ coverage make this comparative approach highly relevant and valuable.
Careful thought has been put into making a representative selection of the CIs and the case study
was carried out in two phases. Five CIs from four diﬀerent continents were selected in the ﬁrst phase
by taking cultural spheres in Huntington’s terms into consideration: South Korea (SK) in the
Confucian cultural sphere of East Asia; UK and France in the Western civilisation of Europe; Mexico
in Latin America; and Morocco in the Muslim world of Africa. Nine people were interviewed during
the summer of 2013, with seven of them from the Chinese home universities, and two from the host
universities. Though the coverage oﬀers a good geographical spectrum, no access to the same
spectrum of data sources from each continent was available. Given the special nature of the CI as
a partnership between home and host institutions, it would be ideal to interview both directors sent
by the home institutions and those hired by the host institutions; similarly, it would gather more
balanced views if teachers both seconded from China and those locally hired are interviewed.
Therefore, in the second phase, four diﬀerent CIs were selected for ﬁeld visits in 2014: two in SK
and two in the UK, while four staﬀ at the CI hosted by the author’s university, including both
directors from the host and home universities, one seconded teacher and one locally hired
administrator, were also interviewed again in a year’s time to compare notes. These selections
were made with an intension to keep the contrasting angle between a generally East and West
cultural perspective, while allowing both intra-country and cross-region comparisons to enhance
validity of the research ﬁndings. On top of this, secondary data were collected for CIs based in the
US, which hosts the biggest number in the world and saw ﬁve setbacks so far; observation also
took place in the CI at the author’s university to contribute to data triangulation.
In sum, the overall data proﬁle of this research composes multiple sources of documents,
including and Annual Reports of the CIs interviewed; CI Annual Development Reports and the
Confucius Institutes Magazine published by Hanban; substantial literature review from both
English and Chinese sources; observations carried out over a period of ten years from 2008 to
2018 at the author’s university; and primary data collected from 27 interviews of ﬁve diﬀerent roles
sharing their insights and experiences at nine diﬀerent CIs. Appendix 1 lists all the codes, dates,
venues and corresponding roles of the interviewees.
Comparing and contrasting the cross-case data
As discussed earlier, both the aim of China’s cultural diplomacy to improve its global cultural position
and the means through global coverage of projects such as the CI give this endeavour a global nature.
However, the world is not one monolith. It is marked by various boundaries: racial, social, territorial,
political and cultural. By drawing on the triangulated data collected, the sections below will ﬁrst
examine how the interactions between the CI and its target audiences diﬀer in diﬀerent cultural
spheres, then test the causation between the DV of the CI’s eﬀective operation and the IV of its ability
to localise the product and process, along with other EVs including ideology, nationalism and media
environment of the recipient country, as well as themediating variable of people-to-people interaction.
One mission statement, two diﬀerent priorities
According to the CI’s Constitution and By-laws, it is a non-proﬁt public institution that aims to
‘develop and facilitate the teaching of the Chinese language overseas and promote educational
11Falk Hartig, ‘Cultural diplomacy with Chinese characteristics: The case of Confucius Institutes in Australia’, Communication,
Politics & Culture 42(Part 2), (2012), pp. 256–276, http://mams.rmit.edu.au/bd8e4ha8e4t8z.pdf (accessed 3 March 2016). ;Falk
Hartig, ‘The Globalization of Chinese Soft Power: Confucius Institutes in South Africa’, Confucius Institute and the Globalization
of China’s Soft Power (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2014).
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and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other international communities’.12
There seems to be an unanimous understanding of the CI’s two-fold mission among all intervie-
wees. However, a clear diﬀerence in terms of priority setting can be observed from the responses
gathered from the UK and SK.
In SK, where the geographical vicinity, cultural closeness, economic and business connections
with China mean that many people have been to China already, or have plenty opportunities to
interact with Chinese people, language teaching was made a clear central task of the CI, as pointed
by SKD2:
China is our neighbour, the closest country to us, historically we were heavily inﬂuenced by Chinese traditions,
Chinese literature and other aspects, so Korean people nowadays are very interested in going to China for
various activities, be it trade, educational or cultural exchanges, there are more and more people, both old and
young, learning Chinese, we have tens of thousands candidates sitting the HSK tests every year, the largest
group in the whole world.
In Hanban Director Xu Lin’s own words, ‘the launch of this program is in response to the Chinese
language craze, especially in neighbouring countries’.13 This may help explain why the very ﬁrst CI
in the world was established in Seoul, where the host organisation has started to promote the
Chinese proﬁciency test (HSK) in SK since 1993. SK has been the number one source country of
international students learning Chinese in China since 2000, with over 20,000 Korean students
study in China every year and 120 universities oﬀering Chinese degree courses in SK.14 All the three
directors interviewed are consistent in commenting that CIs in SK have focused a lot on selling HSK
exams and oﬀering scholarships to school students to study in China.
This priority of language teaching was echoed by a blunt statement from SKSC1 at teacher level:
‘they (Korean students) are very pragmatic, not interested in the cultural aspects, they only care if
they can master the language or not, and Chinese is now included as one of the subjects they can
choose to sit in their entrance examinations to go to university’. SKD1 even commented that:
There is really not much need for the CI to ‘promote’ Chinese language and culture here, in fact, there is such
a high demand and inner drive to master the language that more and more Koreans are voluntarily learning
the language in the hope to use it as a tool to tap into opportunities oﬀered by this next-door neighbour. As
for culture, some of the traditional Chinese cultural practices were kept better in South Korea than in China.
Because of this, UKD4 mentioned that many CIs operating in Asia (especially in Japan, SK and
Singapore) do not request operating funds from Hanban, but only apply for project funding. This
forms a stark contrast to most CIs in other parts of the world that are attracted by Hanban’s funding
to nurture the language program, such as Mexico and Morocco, as well as the U.S.,15 and the
attraction for learning the language is a lot less in the UK in comparison. When commenting on
the fact that the number of UK students choosing to study foreign languages at university level has
been in steady decline for the past seven years, Worne,16 Director of Strategy at the British Council,
used ‘can’t, won’t, don’t’ to sum up the British national view on speaking foreign languages. This was
conﬁrmed by responses received from the interviewees: UKLH2 commented that ‘Chinese is not yet
a language popular enough that would automatically attract students to learn, actually, it still has the
reputation of one of the hardest languages to learn’. Therefore, in UKSC5’s words, ‘trips to China are
the “appetiser”, culture is the “main course”, and language teaching is the “side order”’.
12Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, Hanban website, (2017), http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm
(accessed 27 July 2017).
13Howard French, ‘Another Chinese Export is all the Rage: China’s Language’, New York Times, (11 January 2006), p. A2.
14‘The Evolution and Current Status of Chinese Teaching and Research in South Korea’, Education Oﬃce of the Chinese Embassy
in South Korea website, (2017), http://www.chinaedukr.org/publish/portal109/tab5123/info92047.htm (accessed June 10
2018).
15Marshall Sahlins, Confucius Institute: Academic Malware (Prickly Paradigm Press, 2015).
16John Worne, Language learning in the UK: ‘can’t, won’t, don’t’, The Telegraph, (27 January 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
education/educationopinion/11369703/Language-learning-in-the-UK-cant-wont-dont.html (accessed 1 April 2016).
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Unlike SK, study tours to China are the highlight event for all the other CIs interviewed. They all
mentioned the visitors’ excitement or even shock to see ‘the real’ China with their own eyes
compared to their imaginative impressions, which serves the very purpose of the CI as enunciated
by UKLH3:
When the CI can oﬀer opportunities like this to someone who does not have much expectation, or even some
negative expectations of China, to see China with his own eyes and see the diﬀerence from media image,
Hanban has already achieved its initial purpose. They gain one more person who likes China and wants to
speak for China.
UKSC2’s remarks explained the ‘radiation eﬀect’ this can generate: ‘then the CI can invite them as
guest speakers as the eﬀects are much better than a Chinese speaker. They are not blowing
trumpets for China like propaganda, but have a very fair tone’.
The above appears to reveal a pattern of ‘one mission statement, two diﬀerent priorities’
delivered by the CIs in diﬀerent destinations: regional diﬀerences are clear and allow for localised
priorities: language teaching is the core function of the CIs in the East Asian cultural sphere like SK,
where traditional China enjoys a very respectable culture image and modern China oﬀers new
opportunities; while in Western countries like the UK and US, where vestiges of Orientalism and the
Cold War mentality are ampliﬁed by the distances in culture and space, Chinese cultural introduc-
tion and enhancing local people’s understanding of contemporary China is given more weighting,
with trips to China as a particularly eﬀective tool.
While this section shows that the CI’s ability to localise its product to adapt and meet diﬀerent
needs of the target audiences should be the IV, it also reveals other EVs involved in this process
that resulted in the ‘two diﬀerent priorities’. They will be examined in the sections below.
See China and read China: ﬁrst-hand knowledge vs. third-hand stories
The study tours and scholarships for university students to learn China ﬁrst hand may be an
eﬀective remedy in relieving the symptoms of holding misperceptions of China, but it does not
address the root cause for such misperceptions, which needs to be understood in where do people
get their pre-perceptions from. The example below from the author’s direct observation shows
how deeply-embedded pre-perceptions can be.
In a talk about China, the New Land of Opportunities given to a local British high school, the CI
teacher asked if any students in the audience have been to China before, only one raised his hand.
So the teacher said she would show them a two-minute video clip ﬁrst called China China,17 and
then asked students to share their impressions of China with some key words after watching it.
There is only one-word narrative ‘China’ in the video, repeating itself numerous times throughout
the video with thousands of diﬀerent snapshots from China, from varied landscapes to a wide
variety of wild animals, from diverse food to diﬀerent ethnic groups, wearing diﬀerent costumes
and following diﬀerent life styles in rural and urban China, the message is quite strong and clear:
This is all China, a country of vast diversity. Yet, when the ﬂoor was given to students, the ﬁrst
answer (not from the one who has been to China before) of the key word was ‘communism’. Even
the British teacher at present was surprised: where did he get that from? There is not even
a glimpse of red ﬂag during the video, nor any images of Chinese leaders or government.
So where do people get pre-perceptions from? As pointed out by Morley and Robins, ‘we are all
largely dependent on the media for our images of non-local people, places, and events, and the
further the “event” from our own direct experiences, the more we depend on media images for the
totality of our knowledge’.18 Manzenreiter simply attributes the responsibility for people’s
17China China, published on Youtube on November, 18, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_etl_qkelX0 (accessed
5 May 2016).
18David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity, Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (London:
Routledge, 1995), p. 133.
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misperception to the mainstream media that ‘rather than preparing the space for a dialectic
exploration of alternative modes and views, the media contribute to the reinforcing of national
stereotypes’.19 This can be seen from the common examples given in the interviews that even
when people visit China, they tend to look for the more ‘backward’ side as the ‘real’ China that ﬁts
the stereotypes, despite that everything they see with their own eyes is already the real China. For
example, UKD1 said the highlight of the trip to China was ‘nights out on a bicycle to local areas’;
a similar example was given by Hubbert in her recounts of the ‘Chinese Bridge Summer Camp’ that
‘the night market with snacking on unidentiﬁed creatures roasted on a stick’ was what they
perceived to be a ‘form of Chinese authenticity’.20 Another British student commented that he
found ‘Beijing not as tense politically as imagined: I am not being watched, I can go to places freely
and talk to people on the street freely’. These accounts and the ossiﬁed image of a communist
China planted in that student’s mind show the impact produced by Western media which
‘arrogates to themselves the right to represent all non-Western Others, and thus to provide “us”
with the deﬁnitions by which “we” distinguish ourselves from ‘them’”.21
Willnat and Metzgar’s22 research on ‘American Perceptions of China and the Chinese: Do the Media
Matter?’ is based on the content analysis of 886 news stories about China published in the
New York Times throughout 2010 and a national online survey conducted in early 2011. The
ﬁndings show signiﬁcant associations between respondents’ media use and their views of
China’s economic, political and military power. Their ﬁndings generally support the assumption
that the American public is inﬂuenced primarily by media agenda setting and framing processes,
and that ‘respondents with more news exposure hold more negative perceptions of Chinese
foreign and economic policies’. Another similar research done by a Chinese scholar Zhang23
undertook a thorough analysis of the China-related reports in American mainstream media outlets
including the NYT, Washington Post, Los Angeles Time and CNN, also found that the US press
seldom constructed a favourable image of China, they tend to adopt a negative angle even in
reporting developments achieved in China, such as the Olympic successes or breakthroughs China
made in exploring outer space, the reporting is persistently constructed in an anti-communist
frames and Cold War mentality.
This is supported by the author’s interview ﬁndings, for example, UKSC2 commented that: ‘for
foreigners who have never been to China, their impression of the country is the one conveyed by
the media, which is often tarnished in many countries’. As UKD1 put it:
Some people based their whole understanding of China on the only book they’ve read—Wild Swans; as for
contemporary China, again, they based their knowledge on the one media report they’ve read or watched—
about China’s environmental problems.
UKLH1 elaborated this with an example:
Most people in the local community have a completely outdated knowledge and understanding about China,
their image of China is a country where farmers work in the ﬁeld everywhere with no modern buildings and
modern lifestyle, very poor and backward. What is even worse is those who have never been to China but
thought they knew a lot about China. Most of their perceptions of China are based on media reports, such as
19Wolfram Manzenreiter, ‘The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power’, Journal of
Sport and Social Issues 34(1), (2010), pp. 29–48.
20Jennifer Hubbert, ‘The anthropology of Confucius Institute’, Society of East Asian Anthropology, (5 May 5 2014), http://seaa.
americananthro.org/2014/05/the-anthropology-of-confucius-institutes/ (accessed 1 September 2017).
21David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity, Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (London:
Routledge, 1995), p. 134.
22Lars Willnat and Emily Metzgar, ‘American Perceptions of China and the Chinese: Do the media matter?’ Paper presented at
the 65th Annual Meeting of the World Association for Public Opinion Research, Hong Kong, (June 2012), https://wapor2012.
hkpop.hk/doc/papers/ConcurrentSessionsI/IB/IB-3.pdf (accessed 1 October 2015).
23Jian Zhang, Meiguo zhuliu meiti shehua baodao fenxi [China-related report analysis in American main stream media], Guoji
Guancha [International Review] 1, (2007), http://www.rcgpoc.shisu.edu.cn/c1/d4/c3504a49620/page.htm (accessed
30 May 2015).
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about China’s one child policy and child traﬃcking, Tibet riots, etc, and use this as their judgement of the
whole country.
According to Kunczik,24 mass media and cultural exchange programs are the two strongest image
shapers that inﬂuence public perceptions of a country in the modern world today. In terms of
China, they work well hand-in-hand in most of the Asian countries, while in Western countries such
as the UK and US, where fewer people beneﬁt from direct experience in visiting China, both the
geographical and cultural distances can expand the gap between ﬁrst-hand knowledge and third-
hand stories. Even when presented with an ‘air of authority’ such as mainstream media, and even
when the reporter is reporting live or write the report in-situ, the audience can only see or read
what is edited (intentionally or unintentionally) by the reporter, thus can be best classed as second-
hand information, while editorials written by commentators with second-hand information can
only be taken as ‘stories’ that may not enable the audience to get to know the whole truth. This is
why UKD3 believed that ‘China is a much misunderstood country’, and the CI’s role is to ‘show
them a China that is not shown in local media’, and ‘to provide a window into China, for those who
would otherwise live with their prejudices and ignorance with China’. This was elaborated by
UKLH3 who works in a diﬀerent CI:
In advanced class, all our students have been to China, they are able to understand China in the Chinese way
and more willing to accept the diﬀerence, and they would express the diﬀerence in a more respectable way. If
people do not have the knowledge, they tend to take the opposite stand. . .. . .Therefore, the scholarship we
oﬀer is a great thing, for foreigners to study and stay in China for a period of time. No matter how much we try
to teach, or tell them about China here, it will never match the ﬁrst-hand experience. After having a positive
experience of China, the students would come back to talk up China, no need for us to make a painstaking
eﬀort. It is much more convincing than what we want to feed their mind.
However, research about the CI-related reports in the New York Times25 found that 35.3% reports
were negative, 31.4% were neutral and 27.5% were positive, which is on the whole consistent with
Li & Dai’s26 research about the overall American media environment for the CI, sampling 33 media
including newspapers, journals, TV, radio and websites, and concluded that 50% were negative
reports, 15% were neutral and 35% were positive. There are many examples of selective news
reports and selective interviews, even when there are people-in-the-know available with important
ﬁrst-hand experience of the CI, they are not fully engaged with as the media report can be an
attempt to exploit pre-established assumptions.
In comparison, there were also similar researches done in SK both concerning China-related
media coverage and CI-related speciﬁcally. One study was carried out in 2005 by Yoo,27 who
analysed 632 randomly selected articles from one of the major Korean newspapers, Joong Ang Ilbo,
from January 2000 to November 2004, just before the ﬁrst CI was set up. The study found that
overall attitude of the newspaper towards China were neutral (54.7%), but 33.3% remained
unfavourable. Another study done by Xu28 focused on a case study of Chosun Ilbo from 2007 to
2008 and found that of the China-related reports, 59.4% were neutral and 20.5% were favourable,
in other words, 79.9% of the reports were not negative, showing an overall friendly media
environment towards China. In January 2015, a seven-episode documentary Super China was
24Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Oﬀensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (Cambridge MA: Yale University Press,
2007).
25Yi Liu, ’Guojia wenhua shiyu xia de shehua yunlun yanjiu, yi Niuyue Shibao dui Kongzi Xueyuan baodao de neirong weili’
[Research on China-related media from the perspective of national cultural security—a case study of Confucius Institute
Reports in New York Times], Xueshu Jiaoliu [Academic Exchange] 4, (2014), pp. 202–05.
26Kaisheng Li and Zhangzheng Dai, ‘Evaluation of Confucius Institute’s Media Environment in the US’, World Economy and
Politics 7, (2011), pp. 76–93.
27Yoo-hee Yoo, ‘China News in Korean Media’, National Taiwan University Institutional Repository, (27 November 2007), http://
ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/246246/58325 (accessed 13 November 2015).
28Yulan Xu, ‘Hanguo meiti zhong de Zhongguo guojia xingxiang, yi Chaoxian Ribao weili’ [China’s national image in Korean
media, a case study of Chosun IIbo], Renmin Wang [People’s Daily online], (23 November 2010), http://media.people.com.cn/
GB/22114/206896/207970/13294052.html (accessed 18 October 2015).
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aired by KBS TV in SK, which completely shook China: even the Chinese media could not believe
this was made by a ‘foreign media’: instead of showing the dark side of China ridden with
environmental and human rights issues, it projected the ‘superness’ of China in a very positive
light, so positive that many Chinese audiences commented that it had done a better job than
China’s own central television CCTV.
In the speciﬁc CI-related media research, Jin sampled ﬁve mainstream newspapers and three TV
channels, namely KBS, MBC and SBS,29 and collected their reports of the CIs from November 2004
to November 2012. Jin’s research found that:
Owing to the far-reaching inﬂuence of Confucian thoughts in South Korea, and the homogeneous nature of
Confucian culture in Korean society, the fact that the CI was identiﬁed as a tool of enhancing Chinese soft
power did not lead to more criticisms or oppositions of it; instead, they are more focused on the revelations
this may have for South Korea.
It is thus not surprising that the 2015 Pew reports has found that ‘overall, despite historical and
territorial frictions, Asia-Paciﬁc publics tend to view their regional neighbours in a positive light’,
and ‘Asia-Paciﬁc views of China are far more positive than the perception held by Americans’.30 This
shows diﬀerent media environments in diﬀerent destinations function as one of the EVs that justify
the diﬀerent foci at diﬀerent CIs: more on language teaching in East Asia as the historical
connection and cultural inﬂuence, geographical vicinity and people exchange help achieve the
aim of enhancing mutual understandings; while in Western countries such as the UK and US,
a better understanding of China and Chinese culture is considered as important as, if not more
than mastering its language, and oﬀering ﬁrst-hand knowledge is used as an eﬀective tool to
combat third hand media bias. This helps explain the uneven distribution of CIs all over the world:
110 in the US (No. 1 in the world) and 29 in the UK (No. 1 in Europe), while 649 out of the 1113
Confucius Classrooms (over 58%) in the whole world are located in these two countries alone.31 In
contrast, in the whole of Asia (118 CIs and 101 Confucius classrooms in total) where the demand for
Chinese language learning is arguably stronger, and the whole of Africa (54 CIs and 30 Confucius
Classrooms in total) where the demand for Hanban funding in expanding Chinese provision is
arguably stronger, their stronger desire and interest only made them less prioritised target
destinations of the CI, because the Chinese government wants to use the CI to ‘correct misunder-
standings of China’,32 which are more prevalent in those areas dominated by Western media.
This section discusses the media’s role as an EV in shaping or even solidifying people’s pre-
perceptions, thus aﬀecting the media environment where the CI operates in, but what underpins
the media framing? The next section will probe it further to trace the root cause by revealing
another EV.
Culture and ideology, the two entangled ‘Otherness’
As discussed above, the media inﬂuence means communism still appears to be the lens that China is
envisioned today. Compared with the line of ‘cultural superiority and inferiority’ carved by
Orientalism, more antagonist camps of ‘friends or enemies’ were created by communism, which
was thought to be the other end of binary opposition to freedom and democracy, thus resulted in
China being regarded as the ‘ideological other’ based on the perpetuated polarisation mind-set.
29Xianggui Jin, ‘Hanguo meiti Guanyu Kongzi Xueyuan de baodao yu pinglun’ [Media reports and commentaries concerning
the Confucius Institutes in South Korea], In Zhang Lihua, ed.; Zhongguo Wenhua yu Waijiao, [Chinese Culture and Diplomacy]
(Beijing: zhishi chanquan chubanshe, 2013).
30Pew Research Centre, ‘How Asia-Paciﬁc Publics See Each Other and Their National Leaders’ (2015), http://www.pewglobal.org/
2015/09/02/how-asia-paciﬁc-publics-see-each-other-and-their-national-leaders/ (accessed 3 May 2016).
31About the Confucius Institute/Confucius Classroom, Hanban website, (2017), http://www.hanban.edu.cn/confuciousinstitutes/
node_10961.htm (accessed 24 May 2018).
32Joe Tin-yau Lo and Suyan Pan, ‘Confucius Institutes and China’s soft power: practices and paradoxes’, Compare: A Journal of
Comparative and International Education 46(4), (2016), pp. 512–32.
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China’s cultural diplomacy tries to serve the purpose of reshaping China’s image away from being the
‘cultural other’ and ‘ideological other’, but the CI is meant to only focus on the cultural dimension as
speciﬁed in its mission statement. However, the mixed nature of culture and ideology in that the
latter is ‘part of culture which is actively concerned with the establishment and defence of patterns of
belief and value’33 has rendered the two ‘Otherness’ of China a complex whole over time, making its
separation a one-sided wishful thinking. For example, UKD4 stated that ‘our understanding of the
name Confucius is purely cultural-related, but in the West, it was interpreted as ideological inﬁltra-
tion, and that means brainwash’. UKD2 used himself as an example to retort such assumption:
I do not think the CI is trying to sell political ideology, I myself am not even a Communist party member. It is
not listed as a criterion to select the CI directors or teachers. What we want to do is cultural promotion, and in
today’s information era, it is impossible to brainwash people, local people have full access to a wealth of
information.
Despite the CI’s repeated eﬀorts to separate its cultural promotional role from anything to do
with ideological inﬁltration, it could not stop such criticisms and worries, which was exacerbated
by some Chinese government rhetoric, such as the 2011 speech given by Wang Gengnian,
Director of China Radio International: ‘we should quietly plant the seeds of our ideology in
foreign countries, we must make good use of our traditional culture to package our socialist
ideology.34 Such worries have led to a number of investigations into the CIs and the resulted
close-downs in the US,35 where dual accusations were made against the CI for both ‘political
censorship’ when the CI teachers avoided discussing contentious topics, and ‘ideological inﬁltra-
tion’ when those issues were discussed.
Hubbert’s research also found that because China is routinely imagined as politically repressive,
the purposefully apolitical nature of CI’s pedagogical materials and classroom practices sometimes
works counterproductively, as this ‘political absence’ is interpreted as ‘authoritarian presence’, thus
‘reinforcing perceptions of a repressive Chinese government apparatus’.36 All of her interviewees
recognised that Hanban’s ‘attempts to depoliticise the classroom had this paradoxical eﬀect’, which
was supported by Lueck et al.’s research ﬁnding that despite the CI’s self-proclaimed role focusing
only on Chinese language and culture, the narrative of the CI reports in the New York Times deﬁned
it as ‘a tool that was being used by the Chinese government to favourably inﬂuence American
perceptions of China’s domestic policies and international actions. Contributions of the CI to
Americans’ knowledge of China’s language and culture went largely unreported’.37
The common speculations of the CI’s goal as ideological inﬁltration rather than just cultural
promotion suggests that ideology is an important EV that could work hand in hand with the media
and have fatal eﬀects on the DV of CI’s sustainable development. If this variable tends to be more
related with CIs operating in a less friendly media environment, the next section will look at
another EV that aﬀects CIs operating in a more favourable media environment: nationalism.
Soft cultural boundary and hard nationalism boundary
According to Duara, ‘every cultural practice is a potential boundary marking a community. These
boundaries may be either soft or hard’.38 Groups with soft boundaries between them do not view
33Lloyd Fallers, ‘Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism’, American Anthropologist 3(4), (1961), p. 677.
34Marshall Sahlins, Confucius Institute: Academic Malware, (Prickly Paradigm Press, 2015), p. 8.
35Elizabeth Redden, ‘More Scrutiny for Confucius Institutes; One to Close’, Inside Higher ED, (6 February 2018), https://www.
insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2018/02/06/more-scrutiny-confucius-institutes-one-close (accessed 5 May 2018).
36Jennifer Hubbert, ‘The anthropology of Confucius Institute’, Society of East Asian Anthropology, (5 May 2014), http://www.
aaanet.org/sections/seaa/2014/05/the-anthropology-of-confucius-institutes/ (accessed 1 September 2017).
37Therese Lueck, Val Pipps and Yang Lin, ‘China’s Soft Power: A New York Times Introduction of the Confucius Institute’, Howard
Journal of Communications 25(3), (2014). pp. 324–49.
38Prasenjit Duara, ‘De-constructing the Chinese Nation’, in Unger Jonathan, ed. Chinese Nationalism (New York: An East Gate
Book, 1996), p. 49.
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mutual boundary breaches as a threat, while communities with hard boundaries tend to privilege
their diﬀerences, and develop an intolerance and suspicion towards other cultures. They mark
members oﬀ from non-members in a similar way to the identity creation ability of nationalism,
which ‘describes the creation of an ideology that serves to celebrate and emphasise the nation as
the preeminent collective identity of a people’,39 thus divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’40 .
What is under-discussed is the relationship between nationalism and cultural boundaries.
In contrast to the territorial and national boundaries, the most important attribute of cultural
boundary is that it is always in ﬂux: soft boundaries can harden, and hard boundaries can soften as
well. It is dynamic in nature as a relative concept that must have a reference object. In the frame of
reference for this research, China’s cultural boundaries with SK and the UK are at diﬀerent marks in
the spectrum as evidenced by the cross-case data presented in the above sections: the level of
cultural understanding, historical connections, people exchange, and media inﬂuence as well as
their relative positions in the global cultural terrain all contribute to the diﬀerences. Duara used the
example of changing cultural boundaries between the Manchu and Han in Chinese history in his
book, while the author believes this narrative has contemporary and global relevance when mutual
transformations can ﬁnd perfect demonstrations in looking at China’s cultural boundaries with SK
and the UK respectively.
The cultural boundary between China and the UK is arguably a harder one of the two as Europe
is where Orientalism was bred and the UK was in a diﬀerent ideological camp from China during
the Cold War era, so China has been held as both a ‘cultural other’ and ‘ideological other’ in the
past. The recent economic rise of China in the globalised era, along with the trans-border
exchanges and people mobility has helped generate and stimulate an interest in understanding
China, and common national interests in working together has created an agent in softening the
traditional boundaries. For example, the news headline of ‘Cameron hails UK as ‘best partner in
west’ as he signs £40bn China deal’41 during Xi Jinping’s visit in 2015 to kick oﬀ the ‘golden era’
indicates a softening of ideological stance by economic interests, and 2015 also launched the ﬁrst
UK-China Year of Cultural Exchange. Then in January 2018, against the backdrop of Brexit, Theresa
May visited China with the largest business delegation ever and signed an education deal that will
‘enable more children and more young people than ever to share their ideas about our two great
nations’.42
Oommen43 applied the contradictory trends of ‘isms’ to describe the changes in today’s world:
It is a world of ‘endisms’ (end of history, ideology, nation, geography), ‘postisms’ (postindustrial, postcapitalist,
postmodern) and ‘beyondisms’ (beyond the nation-state, beyond the Cold War). Endisms represent the
disappearance of boundaries, postisms signify the emergence of new boundaries and beyondisms allude to
the elongation of boundaries.
He then concluded that the construction and deconstruction of diﬀerent types of boundaries,
including cultural boundaries, make up the very story of human civilisation and of contemporary
social transformations. We can see the new knowledge of ‘not the end of history’ and ‘beyond the
Cold War’ and the people ﬂows across established boundaries facilitated by cultural diplomacy can
help move the relatively hard cultural boundary between China and the UK towards the softer side.
Meanwhile, the role nationalism plays could potentially move the relatively soft cultural bound-
ary between China and SK towards the harder side as well. Its ability to create a sense of national
39Michael Edson Robinson, Cultural nationalism in colonial Korea, 1920–1925 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014),
p. 9.
40Umut Ozkirimli, Contemporary Debates on Nationalism, A Critical Engagement (New York: Palgrave, 2005).
41Phillip Inman, ‘Cameron hails UK as “best partner in west” as he signs £40bn China deal’, The Guardian, (21 October 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/21/china-and-britain-40bn-deals-jobs-best-partner-west (accessed
12 November 2015).
42‘Theresa May unveils education deal at start of China visit’, BBC News, (30 January 2018), www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics
-42865133 (accessed 1 February 2018).
43T. K. Oommen, ‘Contested Boundaries and Emerging Pluralism’, International Sociology 10, (1995), pp. 251–68.
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identity is constructed against ‘the other’, thus entails cultural resistance and sensitivity to cultural
invasions. Robinson has commented on cultural nationalism in colonial Korea that:
As the idea of nationalism rose among Korean intellectual at the turn of the century, the Confucian tradition
came under attack as an obstacle to the creation of a strong national identity. Subservience to foreign ideas
and cultural norms inhibited the development of a unique, self-conscious Korean identity. Nationalist, there-
fore, work to exhume the Korean past as a repository of nationalist symbols smothering under a mantle of
excessive veneration for Chinese culture. 44
This indicates a delicate balance to strike for the CI as explained by SKD4:
There are aspects of Sadaejuui,45 or admiration and worship of China from history; there are also components
of contempt. Because Korea had been a tributary state to China for thousands of years in history, that some of
the Confucian traditions or rituals that we carry out here in South Korea was already extinct in China, for
example, our wedding and funeral ceremonies are more particular about rituals; and we never say ‘Traditional
Chinese Medicine’ here, it is known as ‘Traditional Korean Medicine’. . .. . .Actually we (the CI) are being very
careful in using the word ‘introducing’ Chinese culture instead of ‘promoting’ it, we always have to clarify that
we are only providing opportunities, not serving the Chinese interests.
Jin’s research of CI-related media reports in SK has found that ‘when the general public reads
reports revealing the huge national interests of China behind the CIs, such reports tend to
stimulate the rise of nationalism’.46 The carefulness in avoiding the wording of ‘promoting
Chinese culture’ was also shared by SKD1 from China, saying that ‘the Koreans are very sensitive
to “cultural invasions” from China, they would accuse you of doing this if you do too much’.
Meanwhile, a number of scholars47 have observed the increasingly assertive Chinese nationalism
that emerged out of the domestic discourse from the 1990s onwards, and commented on the Sino-
centric tendency towards the distinctness of Chinese identity. This has given its Asian neighbours
mixed feelings. On the one hand, these counties are familiar with Confucianism and Confucian
values, which carry universal signiﬁcance in this region. On the other hand, China’s cultural
diplomacy needs to tread a ﬁne line between not appearing as too imposing when promoting
the traditional aspects of its culture, and not too aggressive when showcasing the recent rise of
China. For example, SKLH mentioned the distaste of local people when seeing Chinese national
ﬂags dotting around their city centre squares for CI’s China Day events, giving them a feeling of
‘Chinese takeover’. Another example given by SKD4 was the diﬃculty in selling traditional Chinese
dance performances: ‘they are not exotic enough for the Korean audience, we’re very familiar with
these art forms, and we also have our own folk dances’. If Orientalism may be blamed for the lack
of popularity of such performances in Western countries such as the UK and US; in East Asia, it was
regarded as crossing the boundary that they wish to maintain as their own. It is fair to argue that in
countries of the same Confucian cultural sphere, the cultural boundary is more carved by cultural
nationalism, which ‘aims to regenerate the national community by creating, preserving or strength-
ening a people’s cultural identity when it is felt to be lacking, inadequate or threatened’.48 While
44Michael Edson Robinson, Cultural nationalism in colonial Korea, 1920–1925 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014),
p. 161.
45Sadaejuui (lit. ”serving-the-Great-ism,” Hangul: 사대주의, Chinese: 事大主义) is a Korean term which evolved in the mid-
20th century from a more widely used historical concept. According to Wikipedia, Sadae literally means ‘dealing with the
great’ or ‘serving the great’ and interpreted as ‘loving and admiring the great and powerful’; Juui means ‘ideology’ and it is
conventionally translated as ‘-
ism’. The Chinese term is sometimes translated as Flunkeyism in English, I think it is more accurate to keep the Korean
expression here.
46Xianggui Jin, ‘Hanguo meiti guanyu Kongzi Xueyuan de baodao yu pinlun’ [Media reports and commentaries concerning the
Confucius Institutes in South Korea], Zhang Lihua, ed., Zhongguo Wenhua yu Waijiao [Chinese Culture and Diplomacy] (Beijing:
zhishi chanquan chubanshe, 2013), p. 239.
47Andreas Forsby, ‘An End to Harmony? The Rise of a Sino-Centric China’, Political Perspectives 5(3), (2011), pp. 5–26; Mingjiang
Li, ‘Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect’ in: RSIS working paper, No. 165, (2008); S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University; Xuetong Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
48Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan: A sociological enquiry, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 1.
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cultural nationalism provides the driving force for China to pursue its dream of national rejuvena-
tion, it also oﬀers defence in the recipient countries in protecting their own national identities.
In summary, a soft cultural boundary may coexist with a hard nationalism boundary and vice
versa, which means that the CI has to navigate very carefully with these EVs in consideration,
drawing on the diﬀerent attractions of its oﬀerings. This explains why despite the centralised input
from Hanban and the globalised outreach of the CI, no standard ‘recipe’ can be found for all the
nine CIs interviewed, and stark diﬀerences can be observed in their day-to-day activities.
Localisation is essential here, as the same message sent would be received and perceived diﬀer-
ently in the process of interacting with diﬀerent ideologies, cultural spheres, historical contexts and
media environment of the destinations. In a way, cultural boundaries reconﬁgure themselves and
become more dynamic in the process of cultural diplomacy, during which the ‘end products’ have
to be tailored to each destination rather than having one uniﬁed model as a ﬁt for all.
People-to-people interaction as a moderating variable
Aside from all the above variables, there is a very crucial moderator in this process as described by
Ed Murrow: ‘the real crucial link in the international exchange is the last three feet, which is bridged
by personal contact, one person talking to another’.49 In the case of China, the phenomenal
increase of people-to-people contact is supported by equally unprecedented growth in the two-
way traﬃc: hugely improved international mobility of Chinese citizens, evidenced in the year-on-
year sharp increase of Chinese students, tourists and entrepreneurs venturing abroad; reciprocated
by substantial increase of the number of ‘foreigners’ coming to China, attracted by its generous
oﬀer of scholarships, its booming economy and business opportunities, as well as proliferating
international forums and conferences. It is only reasonable to argue that China is now in a better
position than ever before to close the cultural encounter to the ‘last three feet’.
What the CI oﬀers can considerably contribute in this aspect: by bringing teachers from China to the
host institutions, facilitating student exchange programs between the two partner institutions, orga-
nising study tours, and providing scholarships and chances to study in China. All these help correct
some of the mystiﬁed or imagined ‘knowledge’ about China, like the example given by UKLH1: ‘one
primary school pupil said to her parents that the teacher told them “Chinese people eat dogs”. Kids at
that age never question what the teacher says, but now they have got a Chinese teacher to double
check’. She said quiz is used as an eﬀective means of knowledge transfer at schools: ‘the “true or false”
statement would help to some extent dispel the common misconceptions by explaining the correct
answers’. If the discourse in a classroom implicitly either mainstreamlises or marginalises certain ideas
or values, by being there and telling its own stories, and inﬂuencing students with people-to-people
contacts, the CI would be able to create a ripple eﬀect elaborated by Xu Lin:
The CI sends over 10,000 tutors and volunteers a year abroad, each of them would teach a minimum of 200
students, and there are another 200 families behind these students. Through them, foreigners would see the
amazing changes taking place in China, and the good qualities of Chinese people.50
On its tenth anniversary, the CI received a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping, who has com-
mended its contribution to creating ‘people-to-people, heart-to-heart communication’.51 In a way,
everyone involved in cross-cultural communications can be considered informal ambassadors in
cultural diplomacy, as people-to-people interactions can help combat the unbalanced media
49George Clack, (ed), Edward R. Murrow: Journalism At its Best (Washington DC: Department of State, 2006), http://iipdigital.
usembassy.gov/media/pdf/books/murrow.pdf (accessed 12 May 2015).
50Yi Wang, Wenhua de kunjing zaiyu buzhi bujue, dujia duihua guojia hanban zhuren, Kongzi Xueyuan zong ganshi Xu Lin, [An
exclusive interview with Xu Lin, Director of Hanban, 2014], Jiefang Ribao, [Jiefang Daily], (19 September 2014), http://
newspaper.jfdaily.com/jfrb/html/2014–09/19/content_17605.htm (accessed 3 October 2014).
51Jinping Xi, ‘A Letter to Congratulate the Confucius Institute on its 10th Anniversary and the First Global Confucius
Institute Day’, (25 September 2014), Confucius Institutes Magazine, Special Issue, 35, (2014), pp. 12–13, http://www.confucius-
institute-magazine.com/revistas/english35/ (accessed 10 January 2015).
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inﬂuence and enhance mutual understanding, thus constitute a moderating variable that can
contribute to the CI’s eﬀective operation.
Prominent features of China’s cultural diplomacy
Based on the multiple comparative case studies, three statements are summarised as the promi-
nent features of China’s cultural diplomacy. A comparative perspective plays a critical role in this
process, the words of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ countries are used below as ‘tools to think with’,52 and
historical, political and cultural constructs rather than a geographical one.
(1) China’s cultural diplomacy faces diﬀerent challenges in diﬀerent cultural spheres.
In Western countries with relatively hard cultural boundaries, China’s cultural diplomacy
was staged with Orientalism in the background, and anti-communism in the foreground,
giving it a dual aim of correcting China’s image as being the ‘cultural other’ and the
‘ideological other’;
In Eastern countries with relatively soft cultural boundaries, the softness can be hardened by
the double-edged nature of nationalism, which provides the driving force for China to
launch its campaign of cultural diplomacy domestically, and the defending force for the
recipient countries to safeguard their national cultural identities.
(2) The challenges faced by its ﬂagship project of the CI show that the separation of the dual
mission is hard due to the entangled nature of culture and ideology and the state-led
approach to implementing cultural diplomacy, whose sponsorship, censorship and presence
on the foreground has a paradoxical eﬀect of taking on an ideological overtone when it
wishes to separate it from the cultural dimension.
(3) The globalised outreach of the CI is sustained by a centralised input with localised practice in
setting diﬀerent priorities to adapt to diﬀerent target audiences: focusing on Chinese
language teaching in destinations with relatively soft cultural boundaries, and understanding
China in destinations with relatively hard cultural boundaries.
In sum, China’s cultural diplomacy was launched while carrying the shadows of being the ‘cultural
other’ and ‘ideological other’, when it is delivered in a trademark state-run method, coupled with
its long-established party-state and propaganda system and a political ideology vastly diﬀerent to
the dominant Western model, it would only make the classic suﬃx of ‘Chinese characteristics’
indispensable for an accurate understanding.
Although these features are drawn from the comparative case study of the CIs, they also apply
to other forms and fronts of cultural diplomacy, such as internationalisation of the Chinese media
and artistic exchanges to name a few. Diﬀerent fronts may face diﬀerent challenges, but it is the
same contested terrain that China’s cultural diplomacy is launched into, and by similar state-led
approach that features concentrated state power: at the word of government command, national
level resources are allocated in a campaigning style to create a sensational eﬀect, and it is the
number that is used as measurement to show the implementer’s political achievements. Barr has
commented on ‘the extent to which it attempts to overtly quantify its culture power’53 as a feature
of China’s approach to cultural diplomacy.
In the case of the CI, the goal of letting Chinese culture ‘go global’ is set by the central
government with abundant ﬁnancial input channelled down to Hanban as the implementer at the
forefront, who once translated the goal into a target of establishing 1,000 CIs by 2020 to overtake the
52Stuart Hall, ‘The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power’, In Bram Gieben and Stuart Hall, ed., The Formations of Modernity:
Understanding Modern Societies: An Introduction, Book 1(Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers Ltd
and The Open University, 1992), pp. 185–225.
53Michael Barr, ‘Chinese cultural diplomacy: old wine in new bottles?’ In Kerr, ed., China’s Many Dreams: Comparative
Perspectives on China’s Search for National Rejuvenation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 187.
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Alliance Française. What Paris has managed to realize in 130 years will be achieved by Beijing in less
than two decades. This is reminiscent of those slogans in the Great Leap Forward during Mao’s time
when ‘great’ was measured by a blind pursuit of speed and scale with little attention paid to actual
eﬀects. The number and speed driven mentality risks renders the CI into a kind of vanity project.
During the interviews, Chinese directors both in SK and the UK have mentioned it as a ‘box to tick’:
the Chinese university wants the CI as a proof of ‘internationalisation’ and university prestige. As
UKD2 disclosed, ‘the home institution only cares about this result to show their achievement and get
the ¥200,000 matching fund, but does not care much about the process and quality of the end
product’. There are also cases of setting up a CI to simply please the Ministry of Education as
disclosed by UKD4: ‘in a way, we were entrusted with such a task by the Ministry and are obliged to
carry it out as a way of supporting the Ministry’s work’.
The number-driven mentality is also evident in the evaluation criteria: both the Methods of
Evaluating a Model CI in Europe and CI of the Year set a series of numerical thresholds: How many
students were enrolled? How many students sat the HSK test? How many people participated in
the China Day/CI event? These quantiﬁable measures of outputs tell us little about the impact:
Does the student enrolled in a taster session continue to study Chinese? Does the number of
candidates doing HSK show better understanding of China? Does participating in a China Day
mean any internalised knowledge? Obviously, the answers cannot be found in those specious
numbers, but as told by UKLH2 during the interview, ‘I think Hanban is still number-driven, they
just want to know how many activities have been carried out in how many schools’. UKD2 also
expressed his concern that the CI tends to go a bit ‘too far, too fast’, because ‘this suits the taste of
the Chinese decision makers: they want to see things happen quickly’. When there were comments
about CIs being exported faster than China’s high-speed trains, Liu Yandong, Vice-Premier and
Chairperson of the Council of the CI Headquarters, simply adopted the new nickname of ‘soul high-
speed train’ in her speech commemorating the CI’s tenth anniversary. This analogy was actually
used by Shambaugh54 in criticising China’s unsophisticated approach to cultural diplomacy as
constructing high-speed rail—by investing money and expecting to see development. After all, the
greatness of a cultural leap outward needs to be measured not by how big the stride is or how
extensive the footprints are, but by how deep the footprints are and how long-lasting the
impact is.
Conclusion
Cultural diplomacy is not a one-way dissemination but a two-way interaction between two sets of
identities: the sender’s view of China and the audiences’ perception of China. The multiple CI case
studies show contrasting pictures between diﬀerent cultural spheres: In East Asia where shared
cultural roots underpin the relatively soft cultural boundaries, the national identities are shored up
through cultural nationalism; whereas in Western countries with relatively hard cultural boundaries
to China, the disputes that the CIs have caused serve as a reminder that language teaching and
cultural activities can be ideologically charged. Soft or hard, cultural diplomacy does not necessarily
cross cultural boundaries intact, but has the potential to soften hard boundaries.
This research has found that there are a number of variables at work in this process, and each
variable also contains internal dynamics and there are intertwining interactions going on between
these variables, and thus there is simply no way to delineate and reﬂect this complexity with one
static diagram. However, the diagram below represents an attempt to chart them all out in action.
The DV of the CI’s eﬀective operation is mainly determined by the IV of its ability to localise its
product and process to suit diﬀerent target audiences, meanwhile, a number of EVs also play
important roles, including ideology, nationalism and the media environment in the destinations. In
addition, since we now live in an age where human movements across national borders are
54David Shambaugh, China Goes Global, the Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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happening on an unprecedented scale, people-to-people interactions become an important med-
iator that enables cultural diplomacy to play a more subtle role in facilitating mutual under-
standing. All the variables and the complexity of their inter-relations contribute to the Chinese
characteristics of its cultural leap outward.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Xin Liu is currently a Senior Lecturer and Chinese Course Leader at the School of Language and Global Studies,
University of Central Lancashire, UK. She received her PhD in China’s Cultural Diplomacy and MBA in Change
Management in the same university. Her research interest lies in the multidisciplinary area covering public diplomacy,
cultural studies, international relations, media and communications.
Independ Variable:
CI’s ability to localise its 


















Figure 1. Chart of variables.
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Appendix 1. Interviewee information grid
Code Role of the interviewee Nationality
Date of
interview Venue of interview
Language of
interview
UKD1 CI Director from the British host university GB 06/06/13
03/07/14
Host university in the
UK
Chinese




Host university in the
UK
Chinese
UKD3 CI Director from the British host university GB 09/07/14 Host university in the
UK
English
UKD4 CI Director in the UK from the Chinese
home university
CN 14/07/14 Home university in
Beijing
Chinese
SKD1 CI Director in SK from the Chinese home
university
CN 16/07/13 Home university in
Shandong
Chinese
SKD2 CI Director from the SK host institution SK 22/07/14 Host university in SK Chinese
SKD3 Retired CI Director from the SK host
institution
SK 22/07/14 Host university in SK Chinese
SKD4 CI Director from the SK host university SK 23/07/14 Host university in SK Chinese
FRD CI Director in France from the Chinese
home university
CN 29/07/13 Home university in
Beijing
Chinese
MOD CI Director in Morocco from the Chinese
home university
CN 29/07/13 Home university in
Beijing
Chinese
MXD CI Director in Mexico from the Chinese
home university
CN 29/07/13 Home university in
Beijing
Chinese
UKSC1 CI secondee from the Chinese home
university
CN 07/06/13 Host university in the
UK
Chinese
UKSC2 CI secondee from the Chinese home
university
CN 07/06/13 Host university in the
UK
Chinese
UKSC3 CI secondee from the Chinese home
university
CN 04/07/14 Host university in the
UK
Chinese
UKSC4 CI secondee from the Chinese home
university
CN 23/06/14 Host university in the
UK
Chinese
UKSC5 CI secondee from the Chinese home
university
CN 26/06/14 Host university in the
UK
Chinese
SKSC1 CI secondee from the Chinese home
university
CN 22/07/14 Host university in the
SK
Chinese
SKSC2 CI secondee from the Chinese home
university
CN 23/07/14 Host university in the
SK
Chinese
SKSC3 CI secondee from the Chinese home
university
CN 23/07/14 Host university in SK Chinese




Host university in the
UK
English
UKLH2 CI administrator locally hired by the host
university
GB 03/07/14 Host university in the
UK
Chinese
UKLH3 CI teacher locally hired by the host
university
GB 23/06/14 Host university in the
UK
Chinese
UKLH4 CI teacher locally hired by the host
university
CN 27/06/14 Host university in the
UK
Chinese
SKLH CI teacher locally hired by the host
university
SK 22/07/14 Host university in SK Chinese
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